Strengthening Enforcement: Overcoming Challenges in Implementing the PCRA

India’s Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 (PCRA) carries a powerful constitutional mandate – to make the abolition of untouchability under Article 17 of the Constitution a lived reality rather than a textual promise. Yet, decades after its enactment, the gap between the law on paper and justice on the ground remains wide. To understand why, one must look not just at what the Act prohibits, but at its supplementary provisions – particularly those dealing with the prosecution of public servants and the jurisdiction of civil courts – and more candidly, at the deep institutional and procedural failings that have blunted its edge. This final lens on the PCRA is perhaps the most important for anyone serious about civil rights law in India.

The supplementary provisions: what they say and why they matter 🔗

Beyond its core penal provisions, the PCRA contains several procedural and institutional clauses that shape how the Act operates in practice. These are not peripheral – they directly determine who can be prosecuted, which courts have power to act, and what presumptions ease the victim’s evidentiary burden.

Prior sanction for prosecuting public servants 🔗

One of the most consequential procedural requirements under Indian law is the need for prior governmental sanction before a public servant can be prosecuted. This principle, embedded in Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code (now Section 218 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), applies broadly – and its logic carries into the PCRA’s context.

The test is whether the alleged act has a reasonable connection to the discharge of official duty. As courts have held, the sanction requirement acts as a filter to keep frivolous or motivated prosecutions at bay. However, the same protection that shields honest officers from harassment also, in practice, becomes a shield for those who wilfully neglect or participate in untouchability-related offences.

Significantly, the PCRA addresses this directly. Section 10 of the Act, as amended in 1976, provides that a public servant who wilfully neglects the investigation of any offence under the Act is deemed to have abetted that offence – and is punishable accordingly. This is a sharp statutory provision: it closes the loophole where officers could simply sit on complaints. Yet, its enforcement record has been poor. The sanction requirement, combined with political and caste loyalties within the administration, means that abetting officials rarely face consequences. [Image: Illustration of a police officer receiving a complaint from a Dalit person, with a bureaucratic chain of approval depicted above]

Limitation on civil court jurisdiction – Section 13 🔗

Section 13 of the PCRA bars civil courts from entertaining any suit or proceeding, or passing any decree or order, where the claim is based on a custom, usage, or tradition that imposes disabilities on the ground of untouchability. In plain terms: no one can go to a civil court and ask for legal recognition or enforcement of a practice that discriminates on untouchability grounds. Courts cannot legitimise such customs – whether through injunctions, property disputes, or any other civil remedy.

This is a significant jurisdictional bar. It prevents upper-caste plaintiffs from using civil litigation as a backdoor to reinforce discriminatory practices. For example, a temple trust cannot file a civil suit seeking a declaration of its right to deny entry to Scheduled Caste members based on custom. The civil court must simply refuse jurisdiction. This provision complements the criminal law framework of the PCRA by ensuring that the civil justice system does not become a parallel instrument for perpetuating untouchability.

Corporate and vicarious liability – Section 14 🔗

Section 14 deals with offences committed by companies. Where a company commits an offence under the PCRA, every person who was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company’s business is deemed guilty – unless they prove the offence was committed without their knowledge or that they exercised due diligence to prevent it. This provision anticipates institutional discrimination by organisations, ensuring that corporate structures cannot be used to diffuse individual accountability.

The presumption clause – Section 12 🔗

One of the Act’s most victim-friendly provisions is Section 12, which creates a legal presumption: where an act constituting an offence is committed against a member of a Scheduled Caste, the court shall presume – unless the contrary is proved – that the act was committed on the ground of untouchability. This reversal of the burden of proof is critical. Proving discriminatory intent is notoriously difficult in caste-based cases, and Section 12 acknowledges this evidentiary reality by shifting the onus to the accused to disprove the caste motivation.

Institutional and procedural weaknesses: the enforcement gap 🔗

Even with these provisions, the PCRA’s enforcement record tells a sobering story. The Act’s structural and institutional weaknesses are well-documented – and understanding them is essential for any informed discussion of legal reform in this area.

Staggering pendency and poor conviction rates 🔗

According to the Union Government’s 2022 report on PCR Act implementation, 1,242 cases under the Act were pending trial in courts, with the pendency rate exceeding 97%. This means that the overwhelming majority of cases registered simply sit in the system, unresolved. Conviction rates are equally dismal – the very high rate of acquittals reflects gaps in investigation, evidence collection, witness protection, and judicial processing. The Human Rights Watch has documented that there were virtually no convictions under the Act before 1973, and even after the Protection of Civil Rights Cell was established, witnesses routinely turned hostile and cases collapsed.

Underreporting: the invisible problem 🔗

Low case numbers under the PCRA do not reflect a decline in untouchability. The government’s own report acknowledges that underreporting stems from lack of awareness, fear of retaliation, and a preference for filing cases under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, which offers broader protection and stronger safeguards. A 2018 study by the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) found that untouchability is still practised against Dalits in nearly one-fourth of Indian villages – a stark contrast to the trickle of formal complaints.

Police inaction and institutional caste bias 🔗

Dalits face documented reluctance from police to register FIRs. Station house officers frequently dismiss complaints or refuse to record them. Even when cases are registered, investigation is often perfunctory. The PCRA’s Section 10 was meant to address this – by making wilful neglect of investigation a punishable abetment – but enforcement of this provision against errant officers is virtually non-existent. As the Human Rights Watch report noted, victims are “chased away” from police stations, and even the National Commission for Scheduled Castes has acknowledged the systemic reluctance of law enforcement to engage with untouchability complaints.

The sanction bottleneck in practice 🔗

Where public servants are implicated in untouchability offences – whether as direct perpetrators or as negligent investigators – the prior sanction requirement creates a practical bottleneck. As the Supreme Court has noted, delays in obtaining sanction result in loss of judicial time, fading of witnesses’ memories, and compromise of the accused’s right to speedy trial. Governments frequently sit on sanction requests, and political considerations often determine whether sanction is granted at all. The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, has introduced a 120-day time limit for deciding sanction requests – a welcome step – but this applies broadly and is not PCRA-specific.

Narrow scope and the shadow of the Atrocities Act 🔗

The PCRA’s focus has always been on access-based and social forms of untouchability – denial of entry to public places, refusal of services, social boycotts, and the like. It does not adequately cover physical violence or economic atrocities. The enactment of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 has largely overshadowed the PCRA, with most serious caste-based offences now prosecuted under the more comprehensive PoA Act. This has pushed the PCRA to the margins, applicable mainly to minor offences that the PoA Act may not cover. The result is an Act that has become residual in practice, even as its constitutional purpose remains vital.

Inadequate infrastructure and state-level failure 🔗

Primary responsibility for implementing the PCRA lies with state governments. The central government provides financial assistance under a Centrally Sponsored Scheme for strengthening enforcement machinery, setting up SC/ST Protection Cells, and running awareness campaigns. But several states have not established the required infrastructure or reporting systems. Vigilance and monitoring committees at the district level exist on paper but rarely function meaningfully. The Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment’s own implementation reports reflect stark variation across states – some have active monitoring and inter-caste marriage incentive schemes, while others report no cases at all, which reflects absence of reporting rather than absence of discrimination.

Pathways to reform: what needs to change 🔗

Identifying the weaknesses is only useful if it leads to concrete reform thinking. Several areas stand out as priorities.

Stronger accountability for public servants 🔗

The existing Section 10 abetment provision for negligent public servants needs to be operationalised. This means independent monitoring mechanisms – not internal police oversight – to identify and act on wilful neglect. The 120-day sanction timeline under BNSS 2023 must be applied strictly in PCRA-related cases, and deemed sanction provisions must be extended to prevent indefinite delays.

Addressing evidentiary and procedural barriers 🔗

The presumption under Section 12 is useful, but victims still face enormous barriers at the complaint and investigation stage. Dedicated prosecutors, sensitised magistrates, and improved legal aid for Dalit communities are essential. Witness protection – currently weak in PCRA cases – must be strengthened to prevent the routine turning of witnesses that collapses prosecutions.

Updating the Act’s definitional scope 🔗

Contemporary forms of discrimination – digital exclusion, denial of services through technological platforms, and institutional discrimination in modern settings – are not easily captured by the PCRA’s current language. Updating the Act’s definitions to address these emerging forms would ensure it remains relevant without being eclipsed entirely by the Atrocities Act.

Better coordination with the SC/ST PoA Act 🔗

Rather than treating the PCRA and the PoA Act as separate silos, enforcement agencies should be trained to use them complementarily. The PCRA covers the spectrum of social and access-based discrimination; the PoA Act addresses atrocities. Together, they can provide comprehensive coverage – but only if investigating officers understand both statutes and are mandated to consider both when registering complaints.

The larger picture 🔗

The PCRA’s supplementary provisions – the sanction requirement, the bar on civil court jurisdiction, the presumption clause, and corporate liability – reflect a thoughtful legislative architecture. The problem is not that the law is poorly designed at its core; the problem is that implementation has been chronically under-resourced, under-monitored, and undermined by the same caste hierarchies it was enacted to dismantle. Continuous vigilance, robust enforcement, and public awareness are essential to realise the Act’s full potential – a view echoed by scholars, courts, and government reports alike. What the PCRA needs is not just better law, but better institutional will.

What do you think? Given that the PCRA’s Section 10 already treats wilful neglect by public servants as an offence, why do you think this provision has rarely been used to prosecute negligent police officers? And if the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act largely overshadows the PCRA in practice, does the PCRA still serve a distinct and irreplaceable purpose in India’s civil rights framework?

References

1. https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/1544
2. https://blog.ipleaders.in/section-197-crpc/
3. https://chambers.com/articles/understanding-the-law-of-sanctions
4. https://www.refworld.org/legal/legislation/natlegbod/1955/en/14581
5. https://www.nextias.com/ca/current-affairs/16-07-2025/union-government-report-pcr-act-1955
6. https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/india/India994-13.htm
7. https://www.dalvoy.com/en/upsc/mains/previous-years/2025/law-paper-ii/salient-features-protection-civil-rights-act-1955
8. https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2024/09/04/sanction-to-prosecute-public-servants-change-in-regime-a-balancing-act/
9. https://nhapoa.gov.in/en/cms/constitutional-provisions
10. https://socialjustice.gov.in/writereaddata/UploadFile/arpcr08.pdf