Understanding Federalism in India: Balancing Power Between Center and States

India is home to over a billion people, 28 states, 8 union territories, hundreds of languages, and vastly different regional needs. Governing such a country through a single, all-powerful central authority would be neither practical nor democratic. This is precisely why the framers of the Indian Constitution chose federalism as the structural backbone of governance – a system that distributes power between the Centre and the states, ensuring both national unity and regional autonomy. But India’s version of federalism is unlike any other in the world. It borrows from classical federal models yet tilts decisively toward the Centre, making it a system uniquely designed for India’s complex realities.

What federalism means in the Indian context 🔗

In a federal system, sovereign power is constitutionally divided between two levels of government – a central authority and regional units – each independent within its own sphere. India adopts this model, but with a crucial qualification. Article 1 of the Constitution describes India as a “Union of States” – not a federation. The word “federation” does not appear anywhere in the Constitution. This was a deliberate choice. The framers wanted a strong national government capable of holding together a newly independent, deeply diverse country, while still giving states meaningful autonomy. The result is what scholars and the Supreme Court have repeatedly called a quasi-federal system – one that carries the features of a federation but leans toward a unitary structure when needed.

Federalism is also recognised as part of the basic structure of the Constitution, meaning it cannot be destroyed through constitutional amendments. Even Parliament cannot eliminate the federal character of the Indian state – a principle firmly established by the Supreme Court through its basic structure doctrine.

The Seventh Schedule: the heart of power-sharing 🔗

The most concrete expression of India’s federal design lies in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, which divides legislative authority between the Union and the states through three lists. Article 246 gives this division its legal force.

Union List (List I) 🔗

The Union List contains subjects on which only Parliament can legislate. These are matters of national importance that require uniform laws across the country. Subjects like defence, foreign policy, currency, railways, and communications fall under this list. Currently, the Union List carries 100 subjects. No state legislature can make laws on these matters – Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction.

State List (List II) 🔗

The State List contains subjects where state legislatures have exclusive power to legislate. These are areas of local or regional significance. Subjects like police, public health, agriculture, and local government are governed by the states. This allows each state to craft laws that reflect its particular social, cultural, and administrative needs. The State List originally contained 66 subjects.

Concurrent List (List III) 🔗

The Concurrent List is where both Parliament and state legislatures can make laws. Subjects like education, forests, criminal law, and marriage and divorce sit here – areas where both national standards and regional flexibility matter. The Concurrent List has 52 subjects. Crucially, if there is a conflict between a central law and a state law on a concurrent subject, the central law prevails under Article 254, unless the state law has received Presidential assent.

A hierarchy applies in cases of overlap: Union List takes precedence over the Concurrent List, which in turn takes precedence over the State List. Subjects not mentioned in any of the three lists – called residuary subjects – vest exclusively with Parliament under Article 248. This includes emerging areas like cyber law, space exploration, and digital currencies, further reinforcing the central government’s dominance in new domains.

Key features of India’s federal structure 🔗

Beyond the three lists, India’s federalism is defined by several structural features that distinguish it from classical federations like the United States or Australia.

Single citizenship 🔗

Unlike most federations, India provides for single citizenship, emphasising national unity. There is no concept of “state citizenship” in India. Every Indian is a citizen of India – irrespective of which state they reside in. This is a deliberate unitary feature embedded within the federal framework.

Unified judiciary 🔗

India has a single, integrated judicial system headed by the Supreme Court. This is fundamentally different from countries like the United States, which maintain separate federal and state court systems. In India, the lower courts and district courts are at the base, the High Courts function at the state level, and the Supreme Court sits at the apex – with all courts subordinate to it. This unified structure ensures consistent interpretation of law across the country.

Written constitution and its supremacy 🔗

India has a single written Constitution that is supreme. Both the Centre and the states must act within its boundaries. The judiciary, through the power of judicial review, ensures that no law – whether passed by Parliament or a state legislature – violates the Constitution. This supremacy of the Constitution is itself a federal safeguard.

Bicameral legislature 🔗

At the central level, Parliament consists of two houses – the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha. The Rajya Sabha, as the upper house, represents the interests of the states at the national level. Members of the Rajya Sabha are elected by state legislative assemblies, giving states a formal voice in central law-making.

The Centre’s dominant role: unitary features within federalism 🔗

India’s Constitution consciously concentrates significant power at the Centre. This is not an accident – the framers, shaped by the experience of Partition and the challenge of national integration, wanted a federal system where the Centre could step in when required.

Emergency provisions 🔗

The most dramatic expression of central dominance is the set of emergency provisions under Part XVIII of the Constitution. Three articles – 352, 356, and 360 – grant the Union sweeping powers during emergencies, overriding state authority.

Article 352 (National Emergency) allows the President to declare a national emergency when the security of India is threatened by war, external aggression, or armed rebellion. During such an emergency, the entire federal structure shifts to a unitary one – Parliament gains the power to legislate even on subjects in the State List, and fundamental rights under Article 19 stand suspended.

Article 356 (President’s Rule) empowers the President to take over the administration of a state when its constitutional machinery fails. Based on a Governor’s report, the Centre can dismiss an elected state government and run the state directly. This provision has been historically controversial and was frequently misused until the landmark S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) judgment, where the Supreme Court introduced strict judicial review of President’s Rule proclamations, mandating a floor test and subjecting the Governor’s report to scrutiny.

Article 360 (Financial Emergency) allows the Centre to declare a financial emergency if India’s financial stability or credit is threatened, giving the Union control over financial matters of the states. Notably, a financial emergency has never been declared in India’s history.

Parliament’s extended legislative powers 🔗

Even outside emergencies, Parliament has mechanisms to legislate on State List subjects – for instance, under Article 249 (when the Rajya Sabha passes a resolution in national interest), Article 250 (during a national emergency), and Article 252 (when two or more states request Parliament to legislate). Additionally, Parliament holds the exclusive power to reorganise states – creating new states, altering boundaries, or even abolishing a state – without being bound by the consent of the affected state legislature.

The third tier: 73rd and 74th Amendments 🔗

For decades after independence, India’s federal structure was effectively two-tiered – the Centre and the states. Local bodies like village panchayats and municipal corporations existed but had no constitutional recognition. They depended entirely on state governments for their existence, functions, and funds. The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts, both passed in December 1992 and coming into force in 1993, changed this fundamentally by creating a constitutionally recognised third tier of governance.

73rd Amendment: Panchayati Raj Institutions 🔗

The 73rd Amendment Act introduced Part IX into the Constitution (Articles 243 to 243-O) and added the Eleventh Schedule, listing 29 subjects on which Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) can exercise powers – including agriculture, rural housing, drinking water, social forestry, primary and secondary education, and health and sanitation. The amendment established a three-tier structure of panchayats at the village level (Gram Panchayat), the block level (Panchayat Samiti), and the district level (Zila Parishad). It made elections to these bodies mandatory every five years and reserved seats for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and women. The Gram Sabha – a body of all registered voters in a village – became the foundation of participatory local democracy.

74th Amendment: Urban local bodies 🔗

The 74th Amendment Act added Part IX-A to the Constitution (Articles 243-P to 243-ZG) and introduced the Twelfth Schedule with 18 subjects for municipalities – including urban planning, regulation of land use, public health, slum improvement, and urban poverty alleviation. It established three types of urban local bodies: Nagar Panchayats for areas transitioning from rural to urban, Municipal Councils for smaller urban areas, and Municipal Corporations for larger cities. These bodies were given constitutional recognition and their elections placed under the supervision of State Election Commissions.

What these amendments achieved – and what remains incomplete 🔗

The 73rd and 74th Amendments transformed India’s governance architecture by adding a third constitutional layer, bringing democracy closer to the grassroots. Through over 2.3 lakh Gram Panchayats alone, more than 28 lakh elected representatives now participate formally in India’s democratic structure. Women’s representation in local governance saw a significant rise, with the reservation of at least one-third of seats for women. However, the challenge of translating these constitutional provisions into effective local governance remains – many states have been slow to devolve adequate funds, functions, and functionaries to local bodies, limiting their actual autonomy.

India’s federalism in practice: cooperative and contested 🔗

India’s federal structure is neither purely cooperative nor purely confrontational – it is both, depending on the political moment. The enduring question of state autonomy reasserted itself recently in Tamil Nadu’s landmark constitutional dispute with the Union, where the Supreme Court in 2025 ruled against the Governor’s indefinite withholding of assent to state bills – reinforcing that even the Centre’s constitutional agents cannot override state legislative prerogatives without limit. Such judicial interventions reflect how India’s courts have consistently acted as guardians of the federal balance.

At the same time, mechanisms like the Inter-State Council under Article 263 and the Finance Commission provide structured forums for Centre-state cooperation. The GST, implemented through the 101st Amendment in 2016, reshaped India’s fiscal federalism by creating a unified tax structure – a move that some states welcomed as economic rationalism and others criticised as central overreach into their taxation powers.

India’s model of federalism – with its layered power structure from Parliament down to the Gram Sabha, its strong central framework tempered by judicial review, and its ongoing negotiation between unity and diversity – is a living constitutional design. It continues to evolve with every major court ruling, every election that brings a regional party to power, and every amendment that reshapes the boundary between the Centre and the states.

What do you think? Given that India’s Constitution explicitly tilts power toward the Centre even in a federal setup, do you think this balance has served the goal of national unity without sacrificing regional autonomy? And with the 73rd and 74th Amendments still only partially implemented in many states, what would genuine decentralisation to the third tier actually look like in practice?

References

1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federalism_in_India
2. https://www.britannica.com/place/India/Constitutional-structure
3. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2025/09/15/the-dynamics-of-federalism-in-the-constitution-of-india/
4. https://www.lawctopus.com/clatalogue/clat-ug/federalism-in-india-2/
5. https://www.nayalegal.com/federalism-in-india
6. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/States_of_emergency_in_India
7. https://lawvs.com/articles/federalism-and-centre-state-conflicts-in-emergency-powers
8. https://lawblend.com/articles/the-73rd-and-74th-constitutional-amendments/
9. https://www.clearias.com/panchayati-raj/
10. https://www.drishtijudiciary.com/to-the-point/ttp-constitution-of-india/73rd-and-74th-constitutional-amendment-acts
11. https://padhai.ai/blogs-padhai/schedules-of-indian-constitution-upsc