Balancing Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles: India’s Constitutional Challenge

The Indian Constitution is built on a careful balance between two sets of provisions: Fundamental Rights under Part III, which protect individual liberties, and Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSPs) under Part IV, which guide the state in building a just and equitable society. On paper, they appear to complement each other. In practice, however, the state often finds itself in a difficult position – when it tries to implement a DPSP through legislation, that law may end up restricting a citizen’s Fundamental Right. This creates one of Indian constitutional law’s most persistent and fascinating tensions: how do you pursue collective welfare without trampling individual freedom?

Two different kinds of constitutional promises 🔗

Fundamental Rights – ranging from the right to equality (Article 14) to the right to freedom (Article 19) – are justiciable, meaning a citizen can directly challenge their violation in court. DPSPs, on the other hand, are explicitly stated to be non-justiciable under Article 37 of the Constitution – they cannot be enforced through a court of law. They are, in essence, aspirational guidelines for the state.

But this does not mean DPSPs are toothless. When Parliament enacts legislation to give effect to a DPSP – say, a land reform law to reduce concentration of wealth under Article 39(b) – that law becomes judicially reviewable. And if a citizen claims the law violates their right to property or equality, the conflict becomes very real. As one way of looking at it: the clash between Fundamental Rights and DPSPs is, at its core, a clash between the individual and the state.

How the courts approach this conflict 🔗

Over decades, the Supreme Court of India has developed a layered judicial approach to adjudicating such conflicts. The starting point is always the doctrine of harmonious construction.

The doctrine of harmonious construction 🔗

This doctrine was first clearly articulated in the In Re: Kerala Education Bill case (1957), where Chief Justice S.R. Das held that courts should not treat Fundamental Rights and DPSPs as being in inherent conflict. Instead, they must attempt to give effect to both as far as possible. The key rule: if a law has two possible interpretations – one that upholds the law’s constitutionality and one that does not – the court must adopt the interpretation that saves the law. Only when a single interpretation is possible, and it leads to a conflict with a Fundamental Right, does the Fundamental Right prevail.

In practical terms, this means courts look at whether Part III and Part IV can be read together in a way that serves the Constitution’s larger objectives. The Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers (2003) laid down that courts must avoid head-on clashes between provisions and must construe them so that one provision does not defeat another, unless there is truly no other way.

The criteria courts use to adjudicate conflicts 🔗

When a law implementing a DPSP is challenged as violating a Fundamental Right, courts do not simply strike it down or uphold it in binary terms. They typically examine the following:

1. The extent of the restriction: Does the law merely limit a right, or does it effectively abrogate it? A restriction on the right to hold property for the purpose of equitable distribution may be permissible; a complete elimination of the right is a different matter altogether. The distinction between a restriction and an abrogation is critical – courts have consistently held that Fundamental Rights can be restricted but not destroyed.

2. The purpose of the restriction: Is the law genuinely aimed at implementing a DPSP, or is the DPSP merely being cited as a justification for an otherwise unreasonable state action? Courts look at whether the nexus between the legislation and the DPSP it claims to serve is real and direct. In Bijoya Cotton Mills v. State of West Bengal, the Supreme Court noted that where a law clearly targets socio-economic policy in furtherance of a Directive Principle, greater weight may be given to that objective over individual rights.

3. The availability of alternative measures: Could the state have achieved the same social goal through a means less restrictive of the Fundamental Right? This proportionality-like enquiry asks whether the infringement was necessary or whether less invasive options were available.

Together, these criteria form a practical framework that courts use to navigate this constitutional juggling act – determining whether the balance has been struck fairly between individual liberty and collective welfare.

The evolution of the judicial position: landmark cases 🔗

The relationship between Fundamental Rights and DPSPs has not been static. It has gone through a remarkable evolution shaped by landmark Supreme Court decisions and constitutional amendments.

Champakam Dorairajan case (1951) 🔗

This was the first major confrontation. The Supreme Court held that DPSPs cannot override Fundamental Rights, and that DPSPs must run subsidiary to Part III of the Constitution. The judgment unambiguously placed Fundamental Rights above DPSPs in the constitutional hierarchy.

Golaknath case (1967) 🔗

Parliament had been amending Fundamental Rights to make room for DPSP-implementing legislation. The Supreme Court pushed back hard in Golaknath v. State of Punjab, holding that Parliament had no power to amend or abridge Fundamental Rights at all – a position that significantly constrained legislative action on socio-economic reform.

Kesavananda Bharati case (1973) and Article 31C 🔗

To overcome judicial resistance, Parliament introduced Article 31C through the 25th Constitutional Amendment (1971). This provision stated that a law enacted to give effect to the DPSPs under Articles 39(b) and 39(c) – which deal with equitable distribution of material resources and prevention of wealth concentration – would not be struck down merely because it violated Articles 14, 19, or 31. In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), the Supreme Court upheld the first part of Article 31C but struck down its second part, which had barred judicial review of such laws, finding that judicial review was itself part of the basic structure of the Constitution.

The basic structure doctrine, established in this case, became a decisive constitutional anchor. Parliament can amend the Constitution, but it cannot alter its basic structure – which includes Fundamental Rights as a core element.

Minerva Mills case (1980) 🔗

The 42nd Constitutional Amendment (1976) attempted to expand the scope of Article 31C so that all DPSPs – not just Articles 39(b) and 39(c) – would get protection from challenge under Fundamental Rights. This would have effectively subordinated Fundamental Rights to the entire basket of Directive Principles. The Supreme Court struck this down in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980).

Chief Justice Chandrachud observed that the harmonious balance between Fundamental Rights and DPSPs is itself an essential feature of the Constitution’s basic structure. To give absolute primacy to DPSPs over Fundamental Rights would destroy this balance and, with it, the basic structure itself. The court reaffirmed that Articles 14, 19, and 21 – the “golden triangle” of constitutional rights – cannot be emasculated in the name of DPSP implementation.

The current order of precedence that emerged from this evolution is as follows: Fundamental Rights other than Articles 14 and 19 hold the highest position; DPSPs under Articles 39(b) and 39(c) take precedence over Articles 14 and 19 specifically; all other DPSPs remain below the general body of Fundamental Rights in the hierarchy.

Harmonious construction in action: a practical scenario 🔗

Consider a hypothetical: the state enacts a law requiring private schools to cap their fee structure, citing Article 45 (free and compulsory education) and Article 38 (securing a social order for the welfare of the people). A group of private school operators challenges the law, arguing it violates their right to carry on their occupation freely under Article 19(1)(g).

A court applying harmonious construction would ask: Can the right under Article 19(1)(g) and the DPSP objective under Articles 38 and 45 both be given effect? Can the law be read as a reasonable restriction under Article 19(6) – which allows the state to impose restrictions on the right to practice any profession in the interest of the general public – rather than an outright violation? If yes, the court would uphold the law. Only if no such reading is possible would it strike it down.

This approach aligns with what the Supreme Court noted in Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1993) – that Fundamental Rights are a means to achieve the goals indicated in Directive Principles, and must be construed in the light of those principles. The relationship is therefore not one of competition, but of mutual reinforcement – each giving meaning to the other.

Why the balance matters 🔗

The tension between Fundamental Rights and DPSPs is not a flaw in India’s Constitution – it is a deliberate design. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and the framers of the Constitution understood that individual liberty and social welfare are both essential to a functioning democracy. The judiciary has consistently held that both Fundamental Rights and DPSPs are complementary to each other and together constitute the human rights of an individual – reading one without the other gives an incomplete picture of the constitutional vision.

The challenge, as the courts have repeatedly recognised, is that maintaining this balance is an ongoing exercise. Social needs evolve, political priorities shift, and new legislation constantly tests the constitutional boundaries. In recent years, the nine-judge bench hearing Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra has been examining what exactly “material resources of the community” under Article 39(b) means – and whether laws redistributing such resources can enjoy immunity from Fundamental Rights challenges. The debate is far from over.

What makes India’s constitutional framework resilient is precisely this dynamic: the courts serve as the arbiter, applying the principles of harmonious construction and scrutinising the extent, purpose, and necessity of restrictions to ensure that neither individual rights nor social welfare goals are sacrificed at the altar of the other.

What do you think? When a state welfare law genuinely benefits millions but restricts the rights of a few, should the courts lean towards upholding it – or does strict protection of Fundamental Rights matter more, regardless of the social benefit? And given that DPSPs are non-justiciable, is the current constitutional balance sufficient to ensure that social justice goals are actually realised, or does it leave too much to legislative discretion?

References

1. https://ebooks.inflibnet.ac.in/hrdp01/chapter/fundamental-rights-v-directive-principles-of-state-policy/
2. https://blog.ipleaders.in/conflict-between-fundamental-rights-and-dpsp/
3. https://blog.ipleaders.in/dpsp-and-fundamental-rights/
4. https://www.drishtijudiciary.com/doctrines/constitution-of-india-doct/doctrine-of-harmonious-construction
5. https://blog.ipleaders.in/relationship-directive-principles-state-policy-fundamental-rights/
6. https://www.clearias.com/fundamental-rights-vs-directive-principles-what-if-there-is-a-conflict/
7. https://plutusias.com/fundamental-rights-vs-directive-principles/
8. https://www.scobserver.in/journal/the-effect-of-striking-down-a-substitution-the-article-31c-story/
9. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minerva_Mills_v._Union_of_India
10. https://thelegalquorum.com/minerva-mills-ltd-v-union-of-india-1980-a-critical-analysis-using-the-irac-method/
11. https://lawfullegal.in/fundamental-rights-and-directive-principles-an-analytical-approach-towards-social-justice/