Exploring the Evolution of Broadcast Definition in Copyright Law

When you switch on a news channel, stream a cricket match on Hotstar, or tune into an FM radio station, you are on the receiving end of a “broadcast.” But what exactly does the law mean by that word? The answer is less obvious than it sounds – and it has changed significantly over time. The legal definition of “broadcast” under Indian copyright law has evolved from a narrow concept rooted in early radio technology to a broad, technology-neutral framework meant to cover every conceivable method of transmitting content to the public. Understanding this evolution is essential to grasping why broadcasting organisations enjoy special protection under copyright law, and why the debate over OTT platforms and internet streaming remains legally unresolved even today.

Where it all began: “radio-diffusion” and the Berne Convention 🔗

The story of the broadcast definition in copyright law starts internationally, not domestically. Broadcasting entered the international copyright scene as early as the 1928 Rome Revision of the Berne Convention, which introduced Article 11bis. That provision gave authors the exclusive right to authorise the communication of their works to the public by radio-diffusion – a term that reflects the technology of the era. “Diffusion” referred to the wireless scattering of signals through the airwaves, the only broadcasting method available at the time.

This early framework had a clear limitation: it was built around one technology. As cable television, satellite transmission, and eventually the internet emerged, the term “radio-diffusion” grew increasingly inadequate. Legislators around the world had to decide whether to stick with narrow, technology-specific language or shift to broader, technology-neutral definitions. India, in its Copyright Act of 1957 and its subsequent amendments, chose the latter path – and that choice has shaped the legal landscape for broadcasters ever since.

The Indian definition: Section 2(dd) of the Copyright Act, 1957 🔗

The current definition of “broadcast” in Indian law is found in Section 2(dd) of the Copyright Act, 1957. It defines broadcast as communication to the public – by any means of wireless diffusion, whether in signs, sounds, or visual images; or by wire – and explicitly includes a rebroadcast.

Breaking this down, the definition covers two distinct modes of transmission:

Wireless diffusion covers traditional television and radio signals transmitted through the airwaves. When Doordarshan or All India Radio sends out a signal, this is the mode in operation. The phrase “whether in any one or more of the forms of signs, sounds or visual images” ensures that the definition is not limited to audio or video alone – it covers any combination.

By wire extends the definition to cover cable television and similar infrastructure. When a cable operator sends content through a physical wire into homes, that too is a broadcast under the Act. This was a deliberate legislative choice to ensure that cable casting – which had grown rapidly in India through the 1980s and 1990s – would not fall outside the scope of the law.

The inclusion of rebroadcast is also significant. It ensures that an entity which simply retransmits another broadcaster’s signal is still engaging in a “broadcast” and cannot escape the legal framework by claiming it is merely a relay, not an original transmitter.

From “radio-diffusion” to a technology-neutral definition: why the shift mattered 🔗

The transition from “radio-diffusion” to the broader language in Section 2(dd) was not merely semantic – it had real legal consequences. By the time the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 1994 introduced dedicated provisions for broadcasting organisations under Section 37, the definition of “broadcast” had already been broadened enough to cover cable casting alongside wireless transmission. This mattered because cable television had become a major industry in India by the early 1990s, and without a broad definition, cable operators could have argued they were not bound by copyright obligations at all.

The Bombay High Court addressed this directly in Garware Plastics and Polyester Ltd. v. Telelink (AIR 1989 Bom 331), where it held that broadcasting a video film over cable TV for charges without proper authorisation amounted to infringement under Section 37 of the Copyright Act. This judgment confirmed that the definition of “broadcast” was wide enough to catch cable transmissions – a reading that the legislature later endorsed through explicit statutory language.

What “communication to the public” adds to the picture 🔗

The definition of “broadcast” cannot be read in isolation. It is anchored to the phrase “communication to the public,” which has its own definition under Section 2(ff) of the Copyright Act. After the 2012 amendment, “communication to the public” was defined as making any work or performance available for being seen, heard, or otherwise enjoyed by the public – directly or by any means of display or diffusion other than by issuing physical copies – whether simultaneously or at places and times chosen individually, regardless of whether any member of the public actually accesses it.

The Explanation to Section 2(ff) is particularly telling: it deems communication through satellite or cable or any other means of simultaneous communication to more than one household as communication to the public. This language is broad enough to potentially include internet streaming, since a live stream sent simultaneously to thousands of households is functionally similar to a cable transmission. The definitional framework, read as a whole, suggests that the legislature was thinking beyond just radio and television.

The cable casting question: how the definition accommodated a new technology 🔗

Before the 1994 amendment introduced the “by wire” component expressly into Section 2(dd), there was legal ambiguity about whether cable operators were “broadcasters” at all. Cable television works by transmitting signals through a physical coaxial or optical fibre cable rather than through the airwaves. Purists could argue that “wireless diffusion” did not cover this. The addition of “by wire” to the definition resolved this debate cleanly. A broadcasting organisation under the Act means any entity engaged in communicating to the public through the means described in Section 2(dd), including communication through television and radio – and, after the amendment, through cable as well.

This is a good example of how the Indian legislature approached technological change: rather than creating separate categories for each new medium, it used inclusive and expansive language that could absorb new technologies without requiring a complete rewrite of the statute each time. The shift from “radio-diffusion” to “any means of wireless diffusion” followed by “or by wire” reflects exactly this philosophy.

The internet broadcasting debate: where the definition hits its limits 🔗

The definition in Section 2(dd) is broad – but is it broad enough to cover the internet? This is where the law becomes genuinely contested. The Government of India’s Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) clarified through an Office Memorandum in September 2016 that the definition of “broadcast” read with “communication to the public” appears to include all kinds of broadcast, including internet broadcasting – and that Section 31D (the statutory licence provision) should not be read restrictively to cover only radio and TV.

However, the courts have not uniformly adopted this view. In the landmark case of Tips Industries Ltd. v. Wynk Music Ltd. (Commercial Suit IP (L) No. 114 of 2018), the Bombay High Court analysed Section 31D in depth and held that despite the broad definition of “broadcast,” the legislature had consciously chosen not to include the term “internet broadcasting” in Section 31D. The court read the statutory licence framework narrowly, limiting it to traditional radio and TV broadcasters.

This gap – between a broad definitional framework and a narrowly interpreted statutory licence provision – is at the heart of the current legislative debate. The 161st Report of the Rajya Sabha Parliamentary Standing Committee on the Review of the Intellectual Property Rights Regime in India supported amending Section 31D to explicitly incorporate internet and digital broadcasters, recognising the exponential growth of OTT platforms such as Netflix, Hotstar, Spotify, and Gaana.

The Rome Convention and India’s international context 🔗

India’s approach to the broadcast definition is also shaped by its international obligations. The Rome Convention of 1961 was the first international treaty to formally recognise the rights of broadcasting organisations as a distinct category – separate from authors and performers. It granted broadcasters exclusive rights for 20 years to authorise or prohibit rebroadcasting, fixation, reproduction of fixations, and communication to the public of their broadcasts in places accessible to the public against payment. India’s Section 37, which grants the Broadcast Reproduction Right for 25 years from the date of first broadcast, broadly reflects this framework while extending the protection period.

At the international level, WIPO’s Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights (SCCR) has been working on a dedicated Broadcasting Treaty since the late 1990s, with efforts to address the definitional challenges posed by cablecasting and webcasting. The scope of that proposed treaty – and whether it should extend to internet transmissions – remains one of the most debated questions in international intellectual property law, mirroring the domestic debate in India.

Why the definition matters: practical implications 🔗

The definition of “broadcast” is not just an academic exercise. It determines who qualifies as a broadcasting organisation, which entities are entitled to the Broadcast Reproduction Right under Section 37, who can invoke the statutory licence under Section 31D, and who bears obligations with respect to royalty payments and notice requirements. A narrow definition means fewer entities qualify for protection and fewer must pay royalties. A broad definition does the opposite.

For students and practitioners of copyright law, the definition also illustrates a broader principle: how statutory language is drafted at one point in time can either accommodate or obstruct technological change. The shift from “radio-diffusion” to “any means of wireless diffusion or by wire” was a deliberate act of future-proofing. Whether it goes far enough to cover the internet – without explicit amendment – remains the open question that courts and Parliament continue to wrestle with.

What do you think? Given that the definition of “broadcast” already includes transmission “by wire” and the government has issued advisories suggesting internet broadcasting is covered, should courts adopt a broad interpretive approach and bring OTT platforms within the statutory licence framework under Section 31D – or should that expansion be left exclusively to Parliament through a formal amendment? And as AI-generated content begins to be distributed over streaming platforms, will the current definition of “broadcast” need yet another revision to remain relevant?

References

1. https://infojustice.org/archives/46093
2. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/797096/
3. https://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/legislation/details/15814
4. https://www.quickcompany.in/articles/rights-of-broadcasting-organization-under-the-copyright-act-1957
5. https://ssrana.in/articles/internet-broadcasting-and-section-31d-of-copyright-act-1957/
6. https://www.mondaq.com/india/copyright/1358840/inclusion-of-internet-broadcasting-under-section-31d-of-copyright-act-1957-need-of-the-hour
7. https://www.wipo.int/publications/en/details.jsp?id=320