Analyzing the Role and Challenges of the National Human Rights Commission of India

India is home to over 1.4 billion people. Ensuring that the state does not trample over their fundamental rights is not a small task. That is precisely the job given to the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) – India’s apex statutory body for the protection and promotion of human rights. Since its founding in 1993, the NHRC has received millions of complaints, intervened in court proceedings, visited prisons, and pushed governments to pay compensation to victims. Yet, in 2023 and 2024, an international body linked to the United Nations suspended its accreditation – twice in a row – citing concerns about its independence, diversity, and effectiveness. That tension between mandate and reality is what makes the NHRC one of the most important and contested institutions in Indian public law today.

Origins and legal foundation 🔗

The NHRC was established on 12 October 1993 under the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 (PHRA), which was later amended in 2006 and 2019. It is a statutory body, not a constitutional one – meaning it draws its authority from an Act of Parliament rather than directly from the Constitution. Its mandate covers rights relating to life, liberty, equality, and dignity guaranteed by the Constitution and embodied in international covenants enforceable by Indian courts.

The NHRC’s creation was also a response to India’s international obligations. It was established in alignment with the Paris Principles of 1991, a set of internationally recognized standards adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1993. These principles require national human rights institutions to be independent, pluralistic, adequately resourced, and empowered with sufficient investigative authority.

Composition of the NHRC 🔗

The NHRC is headed by a Chairperson who must be a retired Chief Justice of India or a Judge of the Supreme Court. Alongside the Chairperson, there are four full-time members – including a retired Supreme Court judge, a retired Chief Justice of a High Court, and two individuals with experience in human rights – of whom at least one must be a woman. In addition, the Chairpersons of several statutory commissions, including the National Commission for Women, National Commission for Minorities, National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Tribes, and the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities, serve as ex-officio members.

All members are appointed by the President of India on the recommendation of a committee headed by the Prime Minister. The 2019 amendment to PHRA reduced the tenure of the Chairperson and members from five years to three years, or until they reach 70 years of age, whichever comes earlier.

Functions and powers 🔗

Under Section 12 of PHRA, the NHRC carries out a wide range of functions. Its core work is investigating complaints of human rights violations – either suo motu (on its own initiative) or on receipt of petitions. It possesses the powers of a civil court, including summoning witnesses, demanding documents, and issuing notices to state and central governments. It can also intervene in ongoing court proceedings involving human rights issues, with the court’s permission.

Investigation and inquiry 🔗

The NHRC can deploy its own staff or call upon central and state government agencies for investigation. It can visit any jail or state-run institution to assess living conditions and make recommendations. Importantly, the Commission is barred from taking up complaints filed more than one year after the alleged violation, which significantly limits access to justice for many victims who learn of their rights late or face barriers to filing promptly.

Recommendatory powers 🔗

Upon completing an inquiry, the NHRC can recommend that the government pay compensation to victims, initiate prosecution against guilty public servants, or take corrective action. It also reviews the safeguards provided under the Constitution and recommends remedial legislation. However – and this is a critical limitation – the NHRC cannot enforce its own recommendations. Its decisions are advisory in nature. The government is not legally bound to accept them, which significantly undermines the Commission’s impact.

Promoting human rights awareness 🔗

Beyond case-based work, the NHRC promotes research, spreads human rights literacy, engages with international treaties, and recommends that the government ratify or implement international human rights instruments. It submits an annual report to the central and concerned state governments, which is then laid before Parliament.

Key issues the NHRC has addressed 🔗

Over the years, the NHRC has taken up a diverse range of issues including custodial deaths, bonded labour, manual scavenging, displacement of tribal communities, gender-based violence, and conditions in prisons. In one notable recent intervention, the NHRC directed the Uttar Pradesh government to pay ₹10 lakh compensation to the family of a man who died in police custody – holding the state accountable for custodial negligence and reaffirming that human dignity does not end at the gates of a prison.

Custodial deaths remain among the most urgent concerns tracked by the NHRC. According to data published on its own website, over 2,575 cases of deaths in custody and during police encounters remain pending before the Commission – a figure that underscores both the scale of the problem and the institutional backlog that prevents timely resolution.

Structural and operational challenges 🔗

Despite its broad mandate, the NHRC faces persistent structural problems that limit its effectiveness in practice.

Non-binding recommendations 🔗

The most fundamental limitation is that the NHRC’s recommendations carry no legal force. Governments at both the state and central level can – and often do – ignore or delay acting on them. The Commission has no power to punish violators or directly award relief to victims. A former NHRC chairperson himself described it as a “toothless tiger,” reflecting deep frustration with these structural constraints.

Dependence on government for investigations 🔗

The NHRC does not have an independent investigative wing. It relies on officials deputed from state and central government agencies – often the very governments whose conduct is under scrutiny. The Sub-Committee on Accreditation of GANHRI has repeatedly expressed concern about the secondment of police officers to conduct investigations into human rights violations, noting that this practice could compromise impartiality and discourage victims from coming forward.

Limited jurisdiction over the armed forces 🔗

The NHRC’s jurisdiction over violations committed by members of the armed forces is heavily curtailed. It can receive complaints and seek reports from the government, but it cannot independently investigate such cases. In a country where armed forces operations in conflict zones like Jammu & Kashmir and the northeast have been the subject of serious human rights concerns, this is a major gap.

One-year limitation on complaints 🔗

The statutory bar on complaints filed more than one year after an alleged violation is a practical barrier. Many victims – particularly from marginalized communities – may not know about the NHRC, may lack resources to file complaints promptly, or may fear retaliation. The limitation period is rigid and has been flagged as requiring reform.

Financial dependence on the Ministry of Home Affairs 🔗

The NHRC is financially dependent on annual grants from the Ministry of Home Affairs. This arrangement directly compromises its operational autonomy. Inadequate and government-controlled funding limits the Commission’s capacity to address emerging human rights issues and develop its own independent infrastructure.

The independence question: GANHRI accreditation deferred 🔗

Perhaps the most damaging development in recent years has been the international scrutiny of the NHRC’s independence. The Geneva-based Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI) deferred the NHRC’s accreditation for the second consecutive year in 2024 – the first time this has happened twice in a row. The stated reasons included a lack of transparency in the appointment of members, insufficient gender and minority representation in the Commission’s composition, the use of police officials in investigations, and inadequate engagement with civil society.

The implications are significant. NHRIs with ‘A’ status under GANHRI can participate in deliberations at the UN Human Rights Council and related UN bodies. A deferral means India’s NHRC loses that standing, weakening India’s voice in international human rights forums. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and several other international organizations have jointly raised concerns about the NHRC’s failure to protect people from marginalized communities, religious minorities, and human rights defenders – and called for the commission’s ‘A’ rating to be reconsidered until concrete reforms are made.

Political independence and appointment concerns 🔗

The appointment process is at the heart of the independence debate. The selection committee is headed by the Prime Minister and includes the Home Minister, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, and the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha – meaning the ruling party effectively controls the process. The opposition leader is also part of the committee, but the structural dominance of the executive raises legitimate questions about the political neutrality of appointees. Vision IAS notes that among 393 staff positions, only 95 are held by women in leadership roles – a reflection of the diversity deficit that GANHRI has flagged.

The way forward: reforms the NHRC needs 🔗

Commentators and the NHRC itself have identified several reform pathways. The most consequential would be making the NHRC’s recommendations legally binding – not merely advisory. Without enforcement authority, even well-reasoned orders remain ineffective against reluctant governments.

Other important reforms include building an independent investigative cadre within the NHRC – staffed by professionals accountable only to the Commission – so that investigations are not compromised by government-deputed officials. The appointment process must be made more transparent and genuinely plural, with meaningful participation from civil society, human rights experts, and representatives of marginalized communities. Expanding the NHRC’s jurisdiction to cover armed forces violations and relaxing the one-year limitation period would also significantly broaden access to justice.

Financial autonomy is equally critical. Providing the NHRC with a dedicated budget independent of the Ministry of Home Affairs would allow it to plan long-term, hire independently, and resist institutional pressure. Deeper, constructive engagement with civil society – rather than the adversarial dynamic that GANHRI has noted – would also help rebuild the Commission’s credibility domestically and internationally.

Ultimately, the NHRC’s effectiveness depends not just on its internal reforms but on whether the state is genuinely committed to holding itself accountable. The Commission was built to be a check on governmental power – but that check can only function if the institution is given the resources, independence, and authority to actually use it.

What do you think? If the NHRC’s recommendations were made legally binding, would that fundamentally change how state governments respond to human rights violations – or would it simply shift the site of non-compliance? And given that the appointment committee is dominated by the ruling government, is it structurally possible for the NHRC to be truly independent without a constitutional amendment changing how its members are selected?

References

1. https://nhrc.nic.in/
2. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/principles-relating-status-national-institutions-paris
3. https://www.drishtiias.com/important-institutions/drishti-specials-important-institutions-national-institutions/national-human-rights-commission-nhrc
4. https://spmiasacademy.com/currentaffairs/national-human-rights-commission-nhrc/
5. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/11/27/joint-letter-ganhri-regarding-review-accreditation-status-national-human-rights
6. https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/03/09/rights-groups-raise-concerns-over-indias-national-human-rights-commissions-record
7. https://vajiramandravi.com/upsc-exam/national-human-rights-commission-nhrc/
8. https://www.nextias.com/blog/national-human-rights-commission-nhrc/
9. https://vajiramandravi.com/current-affairs/review-of-indias-human-rights-accreditation-status-deferred/
10. https://visionias.in/current-affairs/monthly-magazine/2024-05-21/polity-and-governance/national-human-rights-commission-nhrc