When we think about competition law, we often focus on the dramatic stuff – cartels being busted, dominant companies being fined, or mergers being blocked. But the Competition Act, 2002 goes well beyond just reactive enforcement. It gives the Competition Commission of India (CCI) a broader mandate: to spread competition culture, to look beyond India’s borders when necessary, to work alongside other regulators, and to reward those who come forward with information about anti-competitive conduct. These lesser-discussed provisions are, in many ways, what make the Act truly comprehensive.
Table of Contents
- Competition advocacy: building a culture of fair play
- What advocacy looks like in practice
- Extra-territorial reach: competition law doesn’t stop at the border
- How Section 32 works in real terms
- Coordination with sectoral regulators: navigating overlapping jurisdictions
- The CCI vs. sector regulator debate
- Leniency provisions: when coming forward pays off
- Why leniency works
- Putting it together: a multi-dimensional framework
Competition advocacy: building a culture of fair play
Enforcement alone cannot sustain a competitive market. Businesses need to understand what competition law requires of them, and policymakers need to be aware of how their decisions affect market dynamics. This is exactly where competition advocacy steps in.
Section 49 of the Competition Act is the legal backbone of the CCI’s advocacy function. It empowers the Commission to undertake initiatives that promote competition awareness and to give its opinion on policies, statutes, or regulations that may affect competition. The idea is simple: prevention is better than cure. If governments, regulators, and businesses understand competition principles early on, fewer violations occur in the first place.
Under Section 49(1), the Central or State Government may refer any proposed legislation, policy, or administrative scheme to the CCI for its opinion on whether it could have an adverse effect on competition. Section 49(2) allows any statutory authority to similarly seek the CCI’s views. Critically, the Commission is required to provide its recommendations within 60 days of receiving such a reference – ensuring that the process does not become a bottleneck in policymaking. However, it must be noted that this opinion is not binding on the authority that sought it.
What advocacy looks like in practice
The CCI’s advocacy work is wide-ranging. It includes publishing advocacy booklets, conducting market studies in sectors like telecom, pharmaceuticals, and digital payments, organising workshops for government officials and judges, and issuing compliance manuals for trade associations. In one notable example, the CCI’s engagement with the Ministry of Railways drew attention to entry barriers in the train catering sector, eventually contributing to policy reforms that opened the market to more operators. The Commission has also increasingly used digital platforms – webinars and social media – to reach a wider audience beyond traditional stakeholders.
Beyond awareness, the CCI has signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with regulators such as SEBI, TRAI, and IRDAI to harmonise regulatory approaches and build a competition-friendly environment across sectors. These MoUs signal institutional cooperation, even when formal legal coordination mechanisms may be limited.
Extra-territorial reach: competition law doesn’t stop at the border
Globalisation means that anti-competitive conduct originating outside India can still harm Indian consumers and markets. A cartel of international manufacturers fixing prices abroad, or a foreign merger that squeezes out competition in the Indian market – these are real threats that a purely territorial law would be powerless to address.
The Competition Act deals with this through Section 32, which gives the CCI explicit extra-territorial jurisdiction. The Act applies to agreements, abuses of dominant position, and combinations occurring outside India’s territory, provided they have or are likely to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) in the relevant Indian market. This is grounded in the internationally recognised “effects doctrine” – the principle that a jurisdiction may regulate foreign conduct if it produces substantial effects domestically.
This provision tracks the effects doctrine originating from United States v. Aluminium Co. of America, where a state was held entitled to exercise jurisdiction over foreign entities whose conduct had substantial effects on its domestic markets. The EU has employed similar reasoning for decades, famously blocking the USD 45-billion GE-Honeywell merger even though neither company was incorporated within the EU.
How Section 32 works in real terms
Section 32 is wide in its scope: it is not limited by the nationality or place of incorporation of an entity, nor by the location where an anti-competitive agreement was entered into. So if two Indian entities – or a foreign and an Indian entity – enter into an agreement abroad that restricts competition within India, the CCI can investigate and pass appropriate orders. The same applies to a foreign company abusing its dominant position in the Indian market, or a cross-border merger that eliminates competition in India.
A prominent real-world example is the CCI’s action against Google for requiring pre-installation of its entire suite of apps on Android devices. This was conduct rooted in global arrangements but penalised for its effects in India. The NCLAT, on appeal, reduced the quantum of the penalty but upheld the CCI’s jurisdiction to penalise foreign conduct impacting Indian markets. In another instance, the CCI exercised extra-territorial jurisdiction against international shipping lines operating abroad for cartelisation that affected freight rates for goods moving to and from India.
It is worth noting that the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023 further expanded the CCI’s penalty computation powers to consider global turnover – not just India-specific turnover – in certain cases, significantly strengthening the deterrent effect for large multinational entities.
Coordination with sectoral regulators: navigating overlapping jurisdictions
India has a layered regulatory landscape. Sector-specific regulators like TRAI (telecom), SEBI (securities), CERC (electricity), and PNGRB (petroleum and gas) govern their respective industries. When competition concerns arise within these regulated sectors, the question of which authority has jurisdiction becomes critical – and sometimes contentious.
The Competition Act provides a coordination mechanism through Sections 21 and 21A. Under these provisions, if a sector regulator is handling a case and finds that its decision may infringe the Competition Act, it may refer the matter to the CCI for an opinion. Similarly, if the CCI is investigating a case and finds that it involves issues under a law administered by a sector regulator, the CCI may make a reference to that regulator for its input. In both cases, the opinion received is advisory – it does not bind either body.
The CCI vs. sector regulator debate
Jurisdictional tensions between the CCI and sectoral regulators have played out repeatedly in Indian courts. A well-known case involved the Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission objecting to the CCI’s inquiry into power distribution companies for allegedly abusing their dominant position. The sectoral regulator argued that such matters fell exclusively within its jurisdiction. Similar disputes have arisen in the petroleum and telecom sectors.
The Supreme Court settled an important dimension of this debate in the Bharti Airtel case (CCI v. Bharti Airtel Limited, Civil Appeal No. 11843 of 2018), ruling that the CCI’s jurisdiction in telecom matters is not ousted by TRAI’s presence. The Court held that CCI is the specialised body for competition analysis and is better positioned to apply structural remedies that promote genuine market competition. CCI’s role, the Court said, cannot be entirely displaced – rather, comity between the two regulators should be maintained, with each respecting the other’s domain.
This relationship reflects a broader principle embedded in the Competition Act: it operates with a non-obstante clause (Section 60 and 62), meaning competition law operates independently of other laws, while still allowing for coordination and cross-referral with sector-specific frameworks.
Leniency provisions: when coming forward pays off
Cartels are secretive by nature. Detecting them through conventional investigation is resource-intensive and often uncertain. To address this, the Competition Act incorporates a leniency regime under Section 46, which incentivises cartel members to voluntarily disclose information about anti-competitive conduct in exchange for reduced penalties.
The CCI follows a first-come-first-served approach: the first member of a cartel to approach the CCI with true, full, and vital disclosures may be eligible for a complete waiver of penalty. Subsequent applicants providing valuable information previously unknown to the CCI may receive reductions of up to 50% and 30% respectively. Importantly, amendments to the Lesser Penalty Regulations have removed the earlier cap on the number of applicants, and have also extended the leniency benefit to individuals – not just enterprises – who come forward with incriminating evidence.
Why leniency works
The logic behind leniency is straightforward: it creates distrust within a cartel. If any one member suspects that another might approach the CCI first and secure full immunity, the incentive to maintain the cartel collapses. The Lesser Penalty Regulations provide incentives for enterprises to voluntarily disclose cartel activities in exchange for reduced penalties, and the extension of this benefit to individuals means that employees and executives directly involved in collusive conduct can now independently seek protection – making it harder for enterprises to suppress internal information about cartel participation.
For the leniency benefit to apply, the applicant must meet several conditions: provide complete and vital disclosure, submit all relevant documents and evidence, cooperate throughout the proceedings, and refrain from concealing or destroying any relevant material. Since the 2018 amendments, enterprises are also required to disclose the identities of individuals involved in the cartel – a significant addition that strengthens the overall enforcement chain.
Putting it together: a multi-dimensional framework
These provisions – competition advocacy, extra-territorial jurisdiction, sectoral coordination, and leniency – collectively reveal a Competition Act that is far more than a penal statute. It is designed to shape market culture, reach misconduct regardless of where it originates, work within India’s complex multi-regulator ecosystem, and make enforcement more effective by rewarding cooperation. Together, they equip the CCI to function as a modern, proactive competition authority – not just a body that reacts after markets have already been harmed.
What do you think? Should the CCI’s opinions on government policy under Section 49 be made binding rather than advisory – and would that strengthen or complicate the policymaking process? And given how frequently jurisdictional disputes arise between the CCI and sector regulators, do you think India needs a clearer statutory framework to resolve such conflicts, rather than relying on judicial intervention case by case?
References
- https://www.cci.gov.in/legal-framwork/act
- https://lawbhoomi.com/competition-advocacy-under-competition-act-2002/
- https://lawfoyer.in/competition-commission-of-india-under-competition-act-2002-composition-powers-functions-and-procedures/
- https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/ba1b31d2/competition-law-fact-sheet-india
- https://corporate.cyrilamarchandblogs.com/2025/11/extra-territorial-operation-of-indias-corporate-laws/
- https://www.mondaq.com/india/trade-regulation–practices/273732/extra-territorial-jurisdiction-of-cci
- https://www.cci.gov.in/public/images/publications_booklet/en/introduction-to-competition-law-part-5-regulatory-bodies-and-coordination-between-the-competi1652182541.pdf
- https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2022)16/en/pdf
- https://www.azbpartners.com/bank/the-competition-commission-of-india-amends-lesser-penalty-regulations/
- https://bhattandjoshiassociates.com/the-competition-commission-of-india/
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