Conventional Weapons and the Quest for Regulation: From Historical Attempts to Modern Challenges

Conventional weapons account for the vast majority of casualties in modern conflicts, yet their regulation remains one of international law’s most complex challenges. While nuclear and chemical weapons have been subject to comprehensive international controls, conventional arms have proven far more difficult to regulate. The international community’s efforts to address this challenge reveal both promising successes and persistent obstacles that continue to shape humanitarian outcomes on battlefields worldwide.

The evolution of conventional weapons regulation 🔗

The regulation of conventional weapons represents a distinct approach within international humanitarian law. Unlike weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons serve legitimate military purposes and are essential tools of national defense. This reality means that complete disarmament is neither realistic nor desirable. Instead, the international community has focused on restricting or prohibiting weapons that cause excessive suffering or have indiscriminate effects.

The cornerstone of modern conventional weapons regulation is the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), adopted in 1980 and entered into force in 1983. The CCW establishes a framework convention with specific prohibitions contained in five annexed protocols. The convention’s unique structure allows flexibility in addressing new developments in warfare technology. States must ratify at least two protocols to become party to the convention, though not all states have ratified all protocols.

The five protocols of the CCW 🔗

Protocol I prohibits weapons designed to injure through fragments undetectable by X-rays. Such fragments, made of materials like glass or plastic, cannot be located through conventional medical imaging, making it nearly impossible for doctors to remove them and treat wounded soldiers effectively.

Amended Protocol II regulates landmines and booby-traps, requiring that anti-personnel mines either be placed in marked minefields or equipped with self-destruct mechanisms. While this protocol does not ban landmines entirely, it establishes important safeguards. The 102 states party to Amended Protocol II include major military powers such as China, India, Russia, and the United States, which have refused to join the more comprehensive Ottawa Treaty banning anti-personnel mines.

Protocol III restricts incendiary weapons, prohibiting their use against civilians and limiting their deployment against military targets near civilian populations. The protocol specifically addresses weapons intentionally designed to cause fire or burning, such as flamethrowers.

Protocol IV prohibits laser weapons specifically designed to cause permanent blindness, and Protocol V addresses explosive remnants of war, requiring parties to clear unexploded ordnance after conflicts end. These later protocols demonstrate how the CCW framework can adapt to emerging humanitarian concerns and new weapon technologies.

A remarkable success: preventing blinding laser weapons 🔗

The adoption of Protocol IV in 1995 stands as one of international law’s most significant achievements in weapons regulation. This protocol represents a weapons system being pre-emptively banned before it was used in warfare. States recognized that blinding laser weapons would cause unnecessary suffering to combatants and pose severe threats to civilians, despite their relatively low cost and ease of production.

The path to Protocol IV began in the late 1980s when concerns emerged about the development of anti-personnel laser weapons designed to permanently blind enemy soldiers. Between 1989 and 1991, the International Committee of the Red Cross convened expert meetings that highlighted the humanitarian consequences these weapons would cause. Participants warned that permanently blinding soldiers would create long-term suffering far exceeding military necessity, and that such weapons would likely proliferate to repressive regimes and non-state actors.

What made the blinding laser ban particularly remarkable was the speed and decisiveness with which states acted. Despite some initial resistance, particularly from countries with existing laser weapons programs, states adopted Protocol IV on October 13, 1995, prohibiting the use, development, production, and transfer of blinding laser weapons. The United States, which had invested in such technology, reversed its position after determining that senior military officers found little support for either the utility or appropriateness of blinding as a method of warfare.

Why the ban succeeded 🔗

Several factors contributed to this preventive success. First, experts demonstrated that blinding lasers would violate the principles of humanity and public conscience embodied in the Martens Clause of international humanitarian law. The European Parliament declared in 1995 that deliberate blinding as a method of warfare was in contravention of established custom and the principles of humanity.

Second, proponents effectively argued that the ban would not impede legitimate uses of laser technology. The protocol was carefully drafted to apply only to lasers with blinding as one of their combat functions, allowing continued development of laser systems for guidance, targeting, and range-finding. This precision in drafting reassured military establishments that the ban would not handicap their operations.

Third, concerns about proliferation resonated with military planners. Experts predicted that inexpensive blinding lasers would inevitably spread to terrorists, criminals, and repressive regimes. Military powers recognized that they would be better off if no one possessed these weapons rather than face an environment where adversaries with little regard for international law deployed them indiscriminately.

The success of Protocol IV has been validated by subsequent events. No state has deployed blinding lasers in warfare, even among non-parties to the protocol. Meanwhile, laser technology has continued to advance in legitimate military and civilian applications, from precision-guided munitions to corrective eye surgery.

The UN Register of Conventional Arms: an incomplete solution 🔗

Beyond regulating specific weapons, controlling their transfer represents another crucial dimension of conventional weapons regulation. Established in 1991, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) was designed to create transparency in international arms transfers. The register requires UN member states to voluntarily report annual imports and exports of seven categories of major conventional weapons: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles.

The theory underlying UNROCA was that transparency would build confidence between states, reduce suspicions about military buildups, and facilitate early warnings of destabilizing weapon accumulations. At its peak around the turn of the millennium, more than 120 states were providing information annually. The register was estimated to capture approximately 90 percent of global arms trade volume, primarily because the world’s largest arms exporters reported consistently.

Declining participation and persistent challenges 🔗

Despite these initial successes, UNROCA has faced declining participation in recent years. By 2022, only 40 UN member states (21 percent) had reported their arms transfers for the previous year, marking the lowest level in the register’s history. This represents a dramatic decline from the 120 states reporting two decades earlier.

Several structural weaknesses undermine UNROCA’s effectiveness. First, reporting is voluntary with no enforcement mechanisms, leading to inconsistent participation. Second, participation has been particularly low among states in regions with international tensions and ongoing conflicts, precisely where transparency is most needed. Third, the quality of reports varies significantly, with some states providing minimal information while others offer detailed accounts.

Moreover, the register’s limited scope presents problems. While it covers major conventional weapons systems, it initially excluded small arms and light weapons, which are responsible for the vast majority of casualties in contemporary conflicts. Although states are now invited to report small arms transfers, this remains optional and reporting rates are even lower than for major weapons systems.

The Arms Trade Treaty: a comprehensive approach 🔗

Recognizing the limitations of UNROCA, the international community developed a more comprehensive instrument. The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which entered into force in 2014, goes beyond mere transparency to establish common international standards for regulating arms transfers. The ATT covers the seven categories in UNROCA plus small arms and light weapons.

The treaty requires states to establish national control systems and prohibit transfers in certain circumstances, including when arms would be used for genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. States must also assess risks that exported arms could be used to commit serious violations of international humanitarian or human rights law. The ATT represents a significant advance in linking arms transfers directly to human rights protection.

However, the ATT faces implementation challenges similar to those affecting UNROCA. Major arms exporters and importers, including Russia, China, and several Middle Eastern states, remain outside the treaty. Even among parties, compliance varies, and verification mechanisms are limited. Recent conflicts have tested reporting commitments, with questions arising about whether states will fully disclose military aid provided to conflict zones.

Persistent gaps and emerging challenges 🔗

Despite progress in specific areas, significant regulatory gaps remain. Explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas cause enormous civilian casualties but remain largely unregulated under binding international law. While Ireland led an effort that produced a political declaration on explosive weapons in 2022, such declarations lack the enforcement mechanisms of treaties.

Emerging technologies present new challenges that the existing framework struggles to address. Lethal autonomous weapons systems, capable of selecting and engaging targets without meaningful human control, raise profound legal and ethical questions. Since 2017, states have discussed regulating these systems through the CCW framework, but geopolitical tensions have thwarted vital international action, with major military powers opposing comprehensive regulations.

The challenge of balancing military necessity and humanitarian protection 🔗

Conventional weapons regulation must balance competing interests. States legitimately need effective weapons for national defense and international security operations. However, certain weapons cause suffering far exceeding military necessity or strike indiscriminately, violating fundamental humanitarian principles.

The CCW’s structure reflects this tension. The convention lacks verification and enforcement mechanisms, and states can withdraw from protocols with one year’s notice after notifying the UN Secretary-General. A small number of states that have chosen to retain, develop, or use weapons considered inhumane by others have repeatedly stalled progress on strengthening the CCW regime.

Regional approaches have sometimes succeeded where global efforts faltered. The Ottawa Treaty banning anti-personnel mines and the Convention on Cluster Munitions both emerged from frustrated CCW parties who pursued negotiations outside the conventional framework. These treaties demonstrate how civil society coalitions prioritizing humanitarian concerns over traditional state security perspectives can achieve significant arms control outcomes.

Looking ahead: the imperative for comprehensive regulation 🔗

The regulation of conventional weapons remains an evolving field requiring continued innovation. The success of Protocol IV on blinding lasers demonstrates that the international community can act preemptively when humanitarian imperatives align with strategic interests. However, declining participation in transparency mechanisms and persistent disagreements over emerging technologies highlight the fragility of conventional weapons control.

For future progress, several elements appear essential. First, states must strengthen existing transparency mechanisms by making reporting mandatory rather than voluntary. Second, the international community needs more effective compliance and verification procedures that respect sovereignty while ensuring accountability. Third, regulatory frameworks must adapt more rapidly to technological developments, particularly in autonomous systems and artificial intelligence.

Most fundamentally, states must recognize that effective conventional weapons regulation serves their long-term security interests. Weapons that cause indiscriminate harm or unnecessary suffering undermine the principles that distinguish lawful warfare from criminal violence. By restricting such weapons, states protect not only civilians but also the legitimacy and effectiveness of their own military operations.

What do you think? Can the success of the blinding laser weapons ban provide a model for regulating emerging technologies like autonomous weapons? How can the international community strengthen transparency in arms transfers when major powers remain outside key treaties?

References

1. https://disarmament.unoda.org/en/our-work/conventional-arms/legal-instruments/convention-certain-conventional-weapons
2. https://disarmament.unoda.org/en/our-work/conventional-arms/convention-certain-conventional-weapons
3. https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/08/precedent-preemption-ban-blinding-lasers-model-killer-robots-prohibition
4. https://disarmament.unoda.org/en/our-work/cross-cutting-issues/military-confidence-building-measures/register-conventional-arms
5. https://unidir.org/the-end-of-transparency-in-international-arms-transfers/
6. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2025-01/features/geopolitics-and-regulation-autonomous-weapons-systems