The Role of Indian Judiciary in Championing Victim Compensation

For decades, the Indian criminal justice system operated almost entirely around one question: is the accused guilty or not? The victim – the person who actually suffered – was often left as a mere witness to their own tragedy, receiving little more than the satisfaction of seeing punishment delivered. That began to change, slowly but meaningfully, through a series of judicial interventions that pushed compensation from the margins to the centre of criminal proceedings. The story of how India’s judiciary championed victim compensation is one of persistent judicial activism, landmark rulings, and a gradual but decisive shift from a punishment-centric to a victim-centric model of justice.

The legal backbone: Section 357 of the CrPC 🔗

The primary statutory vehicle for victim compensation in India is Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. This provision empowers a court, at the time of passing a judgment of conviction, to direct the accused to pay compensation to the victim. It operates under two distinct scenarios. Under Section 357(1), where the sentence includes a fine, the court may order that the fine – wholly or partly – be paid to the victim to cover prosecution expenses or losses suffered. Under Section 357(3), the court can award compensation even when the sentence does not include any fine at all, making it an independent and powerful tool for victim redress.

This second sub-section is particularly significant because it places compensation outside the framework of fines altogether. The compensation under Section 357(3) is not ancillary to punishment – it exists in addition to it. Yet for years after the CrPC came into force, courts rarely used this power. Victims continued to walk away from courtrooms empty-handed, even in cases where they had suffered serious, life-altering harm. It took judicial intervention – most importantly, the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Hari Kishan and State of Haryana v. Sukhbir Singh & Ors. (1988) – to jolt the system into awareness.

The landmark case: Hari Kishan and State of Haryana v. Sukhbir Singh & Ors. (1988) 🔗

This case arose from a violent altercation on September 28, 1982, near a tubewell in Faridkot, Punjab. Joginder, son of Hari Kishan, and his cousin Virender were attacked by a group of accused armed with ballams and dangas. Joginder suffered a severe head injury that permanently impaired his ability to speak. The Additional Sessions Judge convicted seven accused under various sections of the IPC, including Sections 325, 323, and 148. On appeal, the Punjab and Haryana High Court acquitted some accused and released the remaining five on probation, ordering each to pay a paltry Rs. 2,500 as compensation to Joginder.

The matter reached the Supreme Court, which was asked to determine, among other things, whether the compensation awarded was legally sound and adequate. Justice K. Jagannatha Shetty, writing for the bench, did far more than revisit the quantum. The Court declared that Section 357(3) was an important provision that courts had seldom invoked, perhaps due to ignorance of its object, and that this neglect was entirely unacceptable. The Court’s reasoning was rooted in a clear philosophy: compensation serves as a mechanism to reassure the victim that they have not been forgotten within the criminal justice system. It is simultaneously a constructive approach to crime and a step towards reconciling the victim with the offender.

The Supreme Court then recommended to all courts to exercise this power liberally so as to meet the ends of justice in a better way. Crucially, it also laid down practical guidelines for determining what constitutes reasonable compensation. The relevant factors include the nature of the crime, the justness of the victim’s claim, and the financial capacity of the accused to pay. If multiple accused persons are involved, they may be directed to pay in equal proportions unless their means vary considerably. The Court ultimately enhanced the compensation to Rs. 50,000, a substantial enhancement from the Rs. 2,500 originally ordered, reflecting the gravity of Joginder’s permanent disability.

What the court said about the purpose of compensation 🔗

The philosophical importance of Hari Kishan cannot be overstated. The Supreme Court articulated, clearly and for the first time in such emphatic terms, that the power to award compensation is not a peripheral or optional feature of sentencing. The Court held that this power was intended to do something to reassure the victim that he or she is not forgotten in the criminal justice system, describing it as a constructive approach to crime. This framing repositioned victim compensation not as charity or an afterthought, but as a fundamental element of justice delivery itself.

The judgment also made it clear that courts should not treat compensation as subordinate to punishment. Awarding compensation alongside a conviction is a distinct and independent judicial act. This principle has had lasting influence on how Indian courts approach sentencing – though, as later judgments would reveal, implementation remained deeply inconsistent across the country.

Closing the gaps: Section 357A and the state’s responsibility 🔗

A critical limitation of Section 357 was that it could only be invoked upon conviction. If the accused was acquitted, discharged, or simply untraceable, the victim had no remedy under this provision. This was a glaring lacuna. Section 357A was introduced through the CrPC (Amendment) Act, 2008, on the recommendation of the Malimath Committee, and came into effect from December 31, 2009. This provision shifted part of the compensatory burden from the accused to the State itself.

Under Section 357A, every State Government, in coordination with the Central Government, is required to formulate a Victim Compensation Scheme. Courts can recommend compensation from these schemes when the amount awarded under Section 357 is insufficient, or where the case ends in acquittal or discharge, or where the offender is not even identified. The District Legal Services Authority (DLSA) is empowered to determine and disburse the quantum of compensation. In Suresh and Another v. State of Haryana (2014), the Supreme Court reinforced the application of Section 357A, emphasizing that the State’s obligation to compensate victims exists independently of prosecution outcomes.

Further, Sections 357B and 357C were inserted by the CrPC Amendment of 2013. Section 357B ensures that state compensation under Section 357A is payable in addition to any fine imposed under specified IPC provisions for serious offences like acid attacks and aggravated sexual assault. Section 357C mandates that all hospitals – public or private – provide free first-aid and medical treatment to victims of sexual offences and immediately report to the police. These additions reflect a broader legislative recognition that victim rehabilitation requires more than just money.

Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra (2013): making the duty mandatory 🔗

Despite the strong direction given in Hari Kishan in 1988, courts at various levels continued to ignore the question of victim compensation when passing sentences. The Supreme Court had to revisit the issue more than two decades later in Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 6 SCC 770. Here, the Court noted with concern that Section 357 had been consistently neglected despite repeated pronouncements directing its liberal use.

The bench went further than any previous judgment in defining the court’s obligation. It held that while the award or refusal of compensation may be discretionary in a specific case, there is a mandatory duty on every court to apply its mind to the question of victim compensation in every criminal case. Crucially, the Court added that this application of mind must be disclosed by recording reasons – a court cannot simply remain silent on the issue of compensation. If compensation is refused, reasons must be given. The judgment established that the use of the word “may” in Section 357 does not mean courts have the option to ignore the provision – it must be actively considered in every case.

The Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad ruling also reinforced the importance of conducting at least a summary inquiry into the accused’s financial capacity before awarding or refusing compensation. This procedural step ensures that compensation orders are realistic and enforceable, rather than symbolic gestures that cannot practically be fulfilled.

Bodhisattwa Gautam and the constitutional dimension 🔗

The judiciary’s expansion of victim compensation jurisprudence has not been confined to the CrPC framework alone. In Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Subhra Chakraborty (1996), the Supreme Court grounded the right to victim compensation in Article 21 of the Constitution, holding that every victim of sexual assault has an inherent right to compensation as part of her fundamental right to live with dignity. More significantly, the Court directed payment of interim compensation to the victim even before the conclusion of the trial – a remarkable step that recognised compensation as a constitutional entitlement independent of conviction. This judgment broadened the entire conceptual basis of victim compensation from a statutory concession to a fundamental rights obligation.

The Central Victim Compensation Fund and ongoing challenges 🔗

In October 2015, the Central Government established the Central Victim Compensation Fund (CVCF) Scheme to supplement state-level schemes and reduce the wide disparities in compensation quantum across different states. The CVCF targets victims of rape, acid attacks, human trafficking, and women killed or injured in cross-border firing. This was an acknowledgment that state-level schemes were inconsistent and often inadequate.

Yet, despite this layered framework – Section 357, Section 357A, state schemes, and the CVCF – implementation remains uneven across the country. Disparities among state schemes, inadequate funding, bureaucratic delays, and limited awareness among victims have significantly undermined the impact of these provisions. The absence of a uniform national policy, combined with the heavy reliance on judicial discretion at the trial court level, means that whether a victim receives compensation can depend more on which court hears the case than on the merits of the claim.

A 2025 judgment by a larger bench of the Delhi High Court in Rajinder Singh v. State added another dimension to this evolving jurisprudence. The Court held that the Trial Court retains exclusive discretion to award compensation under Section 357 CrPC (now Section 395 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), and that delegating this function to the DLSA through mandatory procedural formats was an impermissible judicial overreach. This ruling restored flexibility to trial courts while maintaining the victim-centric mandate that Hari Kishan had first articulated almost four decades ago.

From punishment to restoration: what the judicial journey tells us 🔗

The trajectory traced by these judgments – from Hari Kishan in 1988 through Bodhisattwa Gautam in 1996, Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad in 2013, Suresh v. State of Haryana in 2014, and the legislative expansions through Sections 357A, 357B, and 357C – reflects a profound philosophical evolution in Indian criminal justice. Landmark judgments like Hari Kishan and subsequent cases underscore judicial sensitivity towards victim rehabilitation and offender accountability through monetary reparations. The judiciary has moved from treating victim compensation as an optional add-on to recognising it as a core obligation of the criminal justice process.

What the courts have built, case by case, is a compensatory jurisprudence that insists on seeing the victim as a subject of rights – not merely a witness or a complainant. The criminal justice system’s legitimacy, these judgments collectively argue, is incomplete if it punishes the offender while leaving the victim without any form of tangible redress. The length of a prison sentence, as Justice Krishna Iyer noted in Maru Ram v. Union of India (1981), is no reparation to the injured or bereaved – it is futility compounded with cruelty, when the victim’s actual needs go unaddressed.

What do you think? Given that courts have held it to be a mandatory duty to consider victim compensation in every criminal case, why do you think so many trial courts in India continue to skip this step entirely – and what structural changes might actually change that? And with the shift from CrPC to the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, do you think the new framework goes far enough to make victim compensation a real and consistent outcome rather than a judicial afterthought?

References

1. https://devgan.in/crpc/section/357/
2. https://cclnusrl.wordpress.com/2020/05/12/an-analysis-of-the-victims-right-to-compensation-in-the-indian-legal-framework-abhay-bhushan-bhandari/
3. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/212245/
4. https://legalvidhiya.com/hari-kishan-anr-vs-sukhbir-singh-ors-1988/
5. https://www.lawyerservices.in/Hari-Kishan-Or-Hari-Singh-and-State-of-Haryana-Versus-Sukhbir-Singh-and-Others-1988-08-25
6. https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=6a02687b-b95a-498f-91ce-a0053747e0c7
7. https://www.casemine.com/commentary/in/suresh-and-another-v.-state-of-haryana:-landmark-decision-on-victim-compensation-under-section-357-a-crpc/view
8. https://nja.gov.in/Concluded_Programmes/2022-23/P-1341_PPTs/3.Victim%20compensation%20scheme%20-Session%20V.pdf
9. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/61901185/
10. https://jsslawcollege.in/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/POWER-OF-THE-COURT-TO-AWARD-COMPENSATION-IN-CRIMINAL-CASES-REVISITED_.pdf
11. https://www.ijcrt.org/papers/IJCRT2511249.pdf
12. https://legislative.gov.in/bharatiya-nagarik-suraksha-sanhita-2023/
13. https://www.lawweb.in/2025/03/llm-notes-reparation-of-victims-under.html